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Abstract
We present a novel approach to account for prefer-
ences in a well known structured argumentation formal-
ism, Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA). The new for-
malism, called ABA+, incorporates object-level preferences
(over assumptions) directly into the attack relation to reverse
attacks. We give several basic desirable properties of ABA+.
Introduction
Argumentation and preferences come a long way, see e.g.
(Simari and Loui 1992). While argumentation deals with
uncertain and conﬂicting information, preferences help to
discriminate among alternatives. Broadly speaking, argu-
mentation represents information via arguments, and attacks
among them reﬂect conﬂicts. These may be asymmetric: in-
formation β may attack information α, but α need not attack
β. Preferences can bring a different type of asymmetry by
insisting that, say, the alternative α is preferred over β.
Example 1. Zed wants to go out and two of his friends, Al-
ice and Bob, are available. Best, Zed would take them both,
but as far as he knows, Bob does not like Alice, although she
does not have anything against Bob. If Zed offers to both of
them at the same time, Bob may be in the awkward position
to refuse Alice’s company. Offering separately, Alice is up
for all three going, while Bob insists on cutting Alice out.
Zed may opt for the latter option. However, had Zed a pref-
erence between the two—say Alice were a better friend of
his—then he would go out with her.
A commonality of abstract argumentation (AA) (Dung
1995) and structured argumentation (see (Besnard et al.
2014) for an overview) in approaching the example above is
to construct arguments A for Alice and B for Bob, and rep-
resent the asymmetric conﬂict by an attack B A. Without
preferences, argumentation semantics (say, stable semantics
(Dung 1995)) sanction {B} as a unique acceptable exten-
sion, i.e. set of arguments. Preferences then play a twofold
role (Amgoud and Vesic 2014): modifying the attack re-
lation and selecting the most ‘preferable’ extensions. Intu-
itively, if A is preferred over B (in symbols, B < A), then
{A} should be chosen as the unique acceptable extension.
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Various argumentation formalisms (see e.g. (Amgoud and
Cayrol 2002; Bench-Capon 2003; Kaci and van der Torre
2008; Brewka et al. 2013; Besnard et al. 2014)) use pref-
erences on the argument level to modify the attack rela-
tion: attacks from less preferred arguments are discarded,
i.e. if B < A, then B  A fails. But this may be prob-
lematic, for instance, if {A,B} becomes a unique exten-
sion, then the intended conﬂict is lost (see e.g. (Kaci 2011;
Amgoud and Vesic 2014) for discussions).
Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) (Bondarenko
et al. 1997; Toni 2014), a well known structured argumenta-
tion formalism, accounts for preferences in one of two ways,
as follows. On the one hand, preferences can be implic-
itly compiled into the object level, i.e. by encoding prefer-
ence information within existing components (assumptions,
contraries and rules), as in e.g. (Kowalski and Toni 1996;
Fan and Toni 2013; Thang and Luong 2014). Such an ap-
proach may, however, produce numerous rules and assump-
tions from a compact preference relation (Wakaki 2014). On
the other hand, in ABA Equipped with Preferences (p ABA
henceforth) (Wakaki 2014), a preference relation is used on
the extension level to select the most ‘preferable’ extensions.
This means that, in Example 1, as {B} is the only extension
to begin with, there is no choice to be made and {A} cannot
be selected.
We propose a new way to explicitly handle preferences
in ABA, advancing an alternative framework for struc-
tured argumentation with preferences. Our formalism, called
ABA+, diverges signiﬁcantly from other structured argu-
mentation formalisms in two aspects.
First, preference information over defeasible knowledge
is used to reverse attacks from an attacker that is less pre-
ferred than the attackee, instead of discarding them. The in-
tuition is that when B ‘tries’ to attack A but fails due to pref-
erence B < A, the conﬂict between B and A is still present,
and should be resolved in favour of A (cf. (Amgoud and
Vesic 2014)).
Second, unlike Preference-based Argumentation Frame-
works (PAFs) (Amgoud and Vesic 2014) that use attack re-
versal with preferences given over arguments, ABA+ uses
attack reversal with preferences given over assumptions (on
the object level), that form the support of arguments. This
is, moreover, done by integrating preferences directly into
the attack relation, without lifting preferences from the ob-
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ject level to either the argument or the extension levels,
thus dispensing with preference aggregation mechanisms
(cf. (Brewka, Truszczynski, and Woltran 2010; Modgil and
Prakken 2013; Amgoud and Vesic 2014; Wakaki 2014)).
In this short exposition, after background on ABA, we
will provide the essentials of ABA+ and indicate some of its
basic properties: conﬂict preservation; being a conservative
extension of ABA; and satisfaction of rationality postulates
(Caminada and Amgoud 2007).
Background
Background on ABA is based on (Toni 2014).
An ABA framework is a tuple (L,R,A,¯¯), where:
• (L,R) is a deductive system with a language L and a set
R of rules of the form ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm with m  0
and ϕi ∈ L for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}; ϕ0 is referred to as the
head of the rule, and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is referred to as the body
of the rule; if m = 0, then the rule ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is
written as ϕ0 ←  and is said to have an empty body;
• A ⊆ L is a non-empty set, whose elements are referred to
as assumptions;
• ¯¯ : A → L is a total map: for α ∈ A, the L-formula α is
referred to as the contrary of α.
We focus on ﬂat ABA frameworks, where no assump-
tion is the head of any rule from R. Flat ABA frameworks
capture, as instances, widely used paradigms of KR, such
as Logic Programming and Default Logic (see e.g. (Bon-
darenko et al. 1997)).
A deduction for ϕ ∈ L supported by S ⊆ L and R ⊆ R,
denoted by S R ϕ, is a ﬁnite tree with the root labelled
by ϕ, leaves labelled by  or elements from S, the children
of non-leaf nodes ψ labelled by the elements of the body of
some rule from R with head ψ, and R being the set of all
such rules. For E ⊆ L, the conclusions Cn(E) is the set of
elements with deductions supported by S ⊆ E (and R ⊆
R), i.e. Cn(E) = {ϕ ∈ L : ∃ S R ϕ, S ⊆ E, R ⊆ R}.
Assumption-level attacks in ABA are deﬁned thus. A set
A ⊆ A attacks a set B ⊆ A, denoted A  B, if there is
a deduction A′ R β, for some β ∈ B, supported by some
A′ ⊆ A and R ⊆ R. For an extension E ⊆ A, we say that:
E is conﬂict-free if E 	 E; E defends α ∈ A if for all
B  {α} it holds that E  B; E is admissible if E is
conﬂict-free and defends all α ∈ E.
The most standard ABA semantics are deﬁned as follows.
A conﬂict-free extension E ⊆ A is: stable, if E  {β} for
every {β} ⊆ A\E; complete ifE is admissible and contains
every assumption it defends; preferred if E is ⊆-maximally
admissible; grounded if E is ⊆-minimally complete.
Example 2. Recall Example 1. Zed’s knowledge can be
represented in ABA as follows. Let L = {α, β, α, β},
R = {α ← β} and A = {α, β}, where α and β stand
for (choosing) Alice and Bob, respectively, and α ← β in-
dicates that Bob does not like Alice. In (L,R,A,¯¯), {β}
attacks both {α} and {α, β}, while {α, β} attacks itself and
{α}. (L,R,A,¯¯) can be graphically represented via its as-
sumption framework, pictured below (in illustrations of as-
sumption frameworks, nodes hold sets of assumptions and
directed edges indicate attacks):
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
This (L,R,A,¯¯) has a unique complete extension {β},
which is also grounded, preferred and stable, and has con-
clusions Cn({β}) = {α, β}.
ABA+
We extend standard ABA frameworks (L,R,A,¯¯) with a
preference ordering  on the set A of assumptions to obtain
ABA+ frameworks (L,R,A,¯¯,), as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. An ABA+ framework is any (L,R,A,¯¯,),
where (L,R,A,¯¯) is an ABA framework and  is a pre-
order (i.e. reﬂexive and transitive binary relation) on A.
From now on, unless stated differently, we con-
sider a ﬁxed, but otherwise arbitrary ABA+ framework
(L,R,A,¯¯,), and implicitly assume (L,R,A,¯¯) to be its
underlying ABA framework. The strict counterpart < of 
is deﬁned as α < β iff α  β and β  α, for any α and β.
We next deﬁne the attack relation in ABA+. The idea is
that preferences reverse attacks such that the attacker con-
tains an assumption less preferred than the one attacked.
Deﬁnition 4. A set A ⊆ A of assumptions <-attacks a set
B ⊆ A of assumptions, written as A< B, just in case:
• either there is a deduction A′ R β, for some β ∈ B,
supported by A′ ⊆ A, such that ∀α′ ∈ A′ α′ 	< β;
• or there is a deduction B′ R α, for some α ∈ A, sup-
ported by B′ ⊆ B, such that ∃β′ ∈ B′ with β′ < α.
The ﬁrst type of attack is called normal, and the second
one reverse. The following example illustrates.
Example 5. Recall (L,R,A,¯¯) from Example 2. Sup-
pose there is a total preference order < on A given by
β < α, representing that Zed prefers Alice over Bob. In
the ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯¯,), {β} ‘tries’ to attack
{α}, but is prevented by the preference β < α. Instead,
{α} <-attacks {β}, and likewise {α, β}, via reverse attack,
and the latter <-attacks both itself and {β} via reverse at-
tack. (L,R,A,¯¯,) can be represented graphically via its
assumption framework as follows (where dotted arrows in-
dicate reverse attacks):
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
In contrast with the ABA framework, where {β}
is unattacked and generates an attack on α, in the
ABA+ framework, {α} is <-unattacked and <-attacks all
sets of assumptions that contain β. This concords with the
intended meaning of the preference β < α, that the conﬂict
should be resolved in favour of α.
Normal attacks follow the standard notion of attack in
ABA, preventing the attack to succeed when the attacker
uses assumptions less preferred than the one attacked. Re-
verse attacks, meanwhile, manifest the conﬂict between two
sets of assumptions by favouring the one which is contra-
dicted (i.e. contains an assumption whose contrary is de-
duced using assumptions from the other set) over the one
which contradicts using less preferred assumptions.
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We next deﬁne the notions of conﬂict-freeness and de-
fence w.r.t.<, and then introduce ABA+ semantics.
Deﬁnition 6. For E ⊆ A we say that: E is <-conﬂict-free
if E 	< E; E <-defends α ∈ A if for all B < {α} it
holds that E < B; E is <-admissible if E is <-conﬂict-
free and <-defends every α ∈ E.
ABA+ semantics can be deﬁned by replacing, in the stan-
dard ABA semantics deﬁnition, the notions of attack and de-
fence with those of <-attack and <-defence.
Deﬁnition 7. A <-conﬂict-free extension E ⊆ A is:
• <-stable if E < {α} for every {α} ⊆ A \ E;
• <-complete if E is <-admissible and contains every as-
sumption it <-defends;
• <-preferred if E is ⊆-maximally <-admissible;
• <-grounded if E is ⊆-minimally <-complete.
From now on, we assume σ ∈ {grounded, stable, preferred,
complete}, and likewise <-σ, to denote a ﬁxed semantics.
In Example 5, {α} is a unique <-complete, <-preferred,
<-stable and <-grounded extension.
Basic Properties of ABA+
The following property of ‘monotonicity of <’ follows
immediately from Deﬁnition 4.
Lemma 1. Let A′ ⊆ A ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B ⊆ A be given. If
A′ < B′, then A< B.
We next consider how ABA+ and ABA attacks relate.
Lemma 2. For any A,B ⊆ A:
• if A B, then either A< B or B < A;
• if A< B, then either A B or B  A.
Proof. Let A,B ⊆ A be arbitrary. Suppose ﬁrst A  B.
Then ∃A′ R β, β ∈ B, A′ ⊆ A, and either (i) ∀α′ ∈ A′
we have α′ 	< β, or (ii) ∃α′ ∈ A′ with α′ < β. In case (i),
A′ < B, and hence A < B, by Lemma 1. In case (ii),
{β}< A′, and hence B < A, by Lemma 1 as well.
Suppose nowA< B. Then (i) either ∃A′ R β, β ∈ B,
A′ ⊆ A and ∀α′ ∈ A′ we have α′ 	< β, or (ii) ∃B′ R α,
α ∈ A, B′ ⊆ B and ∃β′ ∈ B′ with β′ < α. In the ﬁrst case,
A′  {β}, and so A  B, whereas in the second case,
B′  {α}, so that B  A.
Conﬂict Preservation. One of the most prominent criti-
cisms of various formalisms of argumentation with prefer-
ences (see e.g. (Kaci 2011; Amgoud and Vesic 2014)), is
that preferences may disable some attacks, resulting in so-
called defeat relations, which may fail to capture the original
conﬂicts. As argued by e.g. (Kaci 2011), it is highly unde-
sirable for extensions to be ‘defeat-free’ but not conﬂict-free
with respect to the original attack relation. ABA+ avoids this
shortcoming by preserving conﬂicts (due to Lemma 2):
Proposition 3. E ⊆ A is <-conﬂict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯,)
iff E is conﬂict-free in (L,R,A,¯¯).
Example 5 is a simple illustration of the need to preserve
conﬂicts in argumentation: reversing the attack {β}  {α}
into {α} < {β} preserves the conﬂict between α and β,
whereas simply discarding the attack would yield {α, β} as
a unique unintended σ extension (for any σ).
ABA+ as a Conservative Extension of ABA. Note that
any ABA framework can be viewed as an ABA+ framework
with an empty strict preference ordering. Trivially, if there
are no preferences, then there are no reverse attacks, whence
ABA+ ∅-attack relation coincides with ABA attack relation:
Lemma 4. For any A,B ⊆ A: A B iff A∅ B.
So (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅) behaves exactly like (L,R,A,¯¯):
Theorem 5. E ⊆ A is a σ-extension of (L,R,A,¯¯) iff E is
an ∅-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯¯, ∅).
Rationality Postulates. (Caminada and Amgoud 2007)
formulated desirable properties, called rationality postu-
lates, of argumentation systems. Following generalization in
(Modgil and Prakken 2013), we reformulate the postulates
for ABA+. First, an auxiliary deﬁnition is required.
Deﬁnition 8. S ⊆ L is: directly consistent if there are no
ϕ, ψ ∈ S with ϕ = ψ; indirectly consistent if Cn(S) is
directly consistent.
We next formulate the rationality postulates for ABA+.
Deﬁnition 9. Let E1, . . . , En be all the <-σ extensions of
(L,R,A,¯¯,) and I = {1, . . . , n}. Then (L,R,A,¯¯,)
fulﬁls (for <-σ semantics) the Postulate of
• Closure if Cn(Ei) = Cn(Cn(Ei)) ∀i ∈ I;
• Consistency if Ei is directly consistent ∀i ∈ I;
• Indirect Consistency ifEi is indirectly consistent ∀i ∈ I .
We note that (Caminada and Amgoud 2007) originally
intended the postulates to account for classical negation
in logic-based argumentation, which is absent in (Modgil
and Prakken 2013)’s and our formulations. The original in-
tention can be accounted for by, for instance, incorporat-
ing negation into the contrary mapping and imposing cer-
tain rational conditions on a framework (see e.g. (Modgil
and Prakken 2013)). Alternatively, it can be accounted for
by guaranteeing that conﬂict-freeness amounts to (classical)
consistency, e.g. by appropriately modifying the original
ABA framework as in (Toni 2007). To prove that ABA+ sat-
isﬁes (our formulations of) the rationality postulates, we ﬁrst
show that <-conﬂict-free sets are (in)directly consistent.
Lemma 6. Let E ⊆ A be a <-conﬂict-free extension. Then
E is both directly and indirectly consistent.
Proof. If E is <-conﬂict-free, then it is conﬂict-free, by
Proposition 3. If E were not directly consistent, there would
be α, β ∈ E such that α = β. But since {α} ∅ α is a de-
duction supported by {α} ⊆ E and ∅ ⊆ R, we would get
E  E, contradicting conﬂict-freeness of E.
Likewise, if E were not indirectly consistent, there would
be ϕ, β ∈ Cn(E) such that ϕ = β. But then there would be
a deduction Φ R ϕ supported by some Φ ⊆ E andR ⊆ R,
so that E  E, which is a contradiction.
ABA+’s ability to preserve conﬂicts sanctions satisfaction
of the rationality postulates, as our next result indicates.
Theorem 7. (L,R,A,¯¯,) fulﬁls the postulates of Clo-
sure, Consistency and Indirect Consistency, for any <-σ.
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Proof. Satisfaction of the Postulate of Closure is immedi-
ate, and fulﬁlment of the postulates of Direct and Indirect
Consistency follows from Lemma 6.
Related and Future Work, Conclusions
We presented a new formalism, ABA+, conservatively ex-
tending ABA with a novel technique for dealing with
explicit preferences over assumptions. ABA+ is the ﬁrst
structured argumentation formalism to effectively reverse,
rather than discard, attacks due to preference information.
ABA+ incorporates preferences directly into its attack rela-
tion, dispensing with preference aggregation mechanisms on
the argument level and/or the extension level.
ABA+ differs from other formalisms of argumentation
with preferences in various ways. For instance, p ABA em-
ploys preferences on the extension level to discriminate
among extensions; but then, in Example 5, the unique exten-
sion {β} is ‘preferable’, and in case of non-existence of ex-
tensions (e.g. due to odd cycles), no ‘preferable’ extensions
exist. On the other hand, ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken
2013), as well as many other approaches, e.g. (Amgoud and
Cayrol 2002; Bench-Capon 2003; Kaci and van der Torre
2008; Besnard et al. 2014), uses preferences to render some
attacks obsolete, thus losing conﬂicts (cf. Proposition 3).
PAFs (Amgoud and Vesic 2014) instead utilize attack rever-
sal in the AA setting, but with a preference relation over
arguments taken for granted. By contrast, ABA+ takes care
of preferences on the object level (i.e. assumptions), by in-
corporating them into the attack relation.
Future research directions include: formally comparing
ABA+ to various formalisms of argumentation with pref-
erences (e.g. (Modgil 2009; Baroni et al. 2011; Dunne et al.
2011) in addition to the ones mentioned in the paper); ex-
amining other semantics (e.g. ideal (Dung, Mancarella, and
Toni 2007)) and relationships among them; generalizing to
non-ﬂat frameworks (Bondarenko et al. 1997); accommo-
dating dynamic preferences (as in e.g. (Prakken and Sartor
1996)); studying properties of preference handling (as given
in e.g. (Brewka and Eiter 1999)).
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